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BONNIE KAY HARRIS

Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

THERESA GUTIRREZ SPIVEY, the
ESTATE OF GLENDON G. SPIVEY and
UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEMS,

Appeal No. 950494CA

Defendants/Appellees.
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This is an appeal from an order of the Fourth District Court,
rendered by Judge Schofield dismissing Mrs. Harris 1 Petition seeking
to modify the property distribution award of her divorce settlement
with her former husband Glendon G. Spivey.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

iVIariiyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

ooOoo
Bonnie Harris, fka Spivey,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 950494-CA
v.
Theresa Guitirrez Spivey, the
Estate of Glendon Spivey,
Defendant and Appellee.

This matter is before the court upon appellee's motion to
strike appellant's reply brief, filed June 17, 1996, and upon
appellant's motion to enlarge time to respond to motion to
strike, filed July 1, 1996.
On July 8, 1996, appellant filed her memorandum in
opposition to the motion to strike.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant's motion to enlarge time
to respond to motion to strike is granted, with the memorandum
filed on July 8, 1996, deemed timely filed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that ruling on appellee's motion to
strike appellant's reply brief is deferred pending assignment of
the appeal to a panel of this court for disposition.
Dated this /fy
FOR THE COURT:

Gregory K. Orme

day of July, 1996.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on July 18, 1996, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the parties listed below:
Charles A. Schultz
Attorney at Law for Appellant
P.O. Box 526382
Salt Lake City, UT 84152-6382
Vernon L. Snow
Attorney at Law for Appellee/Theresa G. Spivey
128 East 100 North
Provo, Ut 84606
M. Dayle Jeffs
Jeffs & Jeffs, P.C.
Attorney at Law for Appellee/Theresa G. Spivey
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603
Sidney Gilbert
Gilbert & Stewart
190 West 800 North
Provo, Utah 84 601
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below:
Fourth District Court
125 North 100 West
P.O. Box 1847
Provo, UT 84601
Dated^this July 18, 1996.
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This is an appeal from an order of the Fourth District Court,
rendered by Judge Schofield dismissing Mrs. Harris' Petition seeking
to modify the property distribution award of her divorce settlement
with her former husband Glendon G. Spivey.
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I
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to this Appeal are the Plaintiff/Appellant Bonnie Kay
Harris (hereinafter, "Mrs. Harris") and the Defendant/Appellee Theresa
Gutirrez Spivey (hereinafter, "Spivey").
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IV
OBJECTIONS TO SPIVETS STANDARD OF REVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mrs. Harris objects to Spivey's erroneous standard of review for
issues of facts on the appeal of her Motion to Dismiss. Motions to
dismiss are reviewed under a correctness of error standard, both
issues of fact and issues of law, without any deference to the trial

court's ruling, not under a clearly erroneous standard as Spivey
asserts in her Brief.

Barnard v. Utah State Bar. 857 P.2d 917 (Utah

1993), citing, Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985);
Petersen v. Davis County School Dist., 855 P.2d 241 (Utah 1993).
Mrs. Harris also objects to paragraph No. 9 of Spivey's Statement
of Facts.

Glendon G. Spivey (hereinafter, "Glendon") did not change

the beneficiaries on his retirement and 401K plan as Spivey asserts.
Spivey made the changes and had Glendon sign the form at a time when
he could neither read nor write beyond signing his name.

Spivey

admitted in a deposition subsequent to the Order of Dismissal in this
matter that she is the one who made the changes on Glendon's
retirement and pension plans.
Mrs. Harris objects to paragraph No. 10 of Spivey1s Statement of
Facts.

Wade Spivey is not a beneficiary of Glendon's retirement and

pension benefits and never was a beneficiary.

Only Spivey was a

beneficiary of the benefits, which have since been distributed to her.
Mrs. Harris objects to paragraph No. 11 of Spivey's Statement of
Facts.

Spivey and Wade are not dependent on Glendon's retirement and

pension benefits for their health, welfare, education and living
expenses.

Wade receives approximately $900.00 per month social

security benefits.

Spivey also receives social security benefits,

Spivey received all of Glendon's savings, checking accounts, life
insurance benefits, credit union accounts and insurance.
a $250,000.00 home with no mortgage.

She lives in

Her motor vehicles are owned

free and clear of any loans, and she is presently employed.
Mrs. Harris objects to paragraph No. 14 of Spivey's Statement of
Facts.

Glendon was not deceased on stipulation as Spivey asserts.

Mrs. Harris objects to paragraph No. 15 of Spivey's Statement of

Facts.

Paragraph No. 15 is not a statement of fact.

What Spivey

believes or what appears to be something in her mind is not a
statement of fact.

It is merely her opinion, speculation, and

conclusion.
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VI
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Mrs.
Harris1 Petition is barred by the doctrine of laches.

The trial court

also erred as a mater of law in concluding that Mrs. Harris1 Petition
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

The trial court further

erred, as a matter of law, in concluding that Mrs. Harris1 Petition is
barred by the holding of Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121
(Utah App. 1988).

And, the trial court again erred as a matter of law

in determining that the divorce decree between Mrs. Harris and Glendon
cannot be modified after Glendon's death.

VII
ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN GRANTING SPIVEY'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT MRS.
HARRIS' PETITION WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES.
Spivey has no legitimate response to Mrs. Harris1 assertion that
the court erred in concluding that Mrs. Harris1 Petition was barred by
the doctrine of laches. Spivey cannot cite this Court to any case or
other authority contradicting the cases and treatises cited by Mrs.
Harris in her Appeal Brief.

Therefore, Spivey, in a pathetic attempt

to breath life into her hapless argument, and in direct contravention
of Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, cites to
the unpublished decision of Judge Schofield in this very case as
precedential authority.

Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of Judicial

Administration specifically states:
Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value and shall not be
cited in the courts of this state, except for purposes of applying the doctrine of the law of the
case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel
If Spivey wishes to refer to Judge Schofield's decision in this
case it should be as a cite to the record in Spivey's Statement of
Facts, as a footnote in her Brief or as background for argument, but
it should not be cited as authority in her argument in chief.

It is

the ultimate boot-strap effort to cite as authority the very decision
of the trial court that is being appealed.

Spivey's citation to Judge

Schofield's decision is not only totally devoid of any precedential
value, it is a direct violation of Utah law, and that portion of
Spivey's brief should be stricken.
Spivey's assertion that laches applies in this case because Mrs.
Harris allegedly had all facts concerning Glendon's assets available
to her during the divorce proceeding is not only legally incorrect,
but it is also factually untrue.

Mrs. Harris never knew that Glendon

had any retirement benefits to be apportioned in their divorce.
Glendon falsely represented in documents filed with the Court, and
signed under oath, that he had no retirement benefits.

Mrs. Harris

only learned of Glendon's retirement benefits in 1995, as a result of
her counsel's research in the probate case of Glendon's estate.
Therefore, and contrary to Spivey's assertion, it was not factually or
legally possible for Mrs. Harris to assert her rights to a martial
asset, i.e., Glendon's retirement and pension benefits, before she
knew of its existence.
Spivey has failed to demonstrate that she has been prejudiced by
Mrs. Harris' failure to assert her lawful right to her share of
Glendon's retirement and pension benefits until this time.

While

Spivey is clearly entitled to that portion of Glendon's retirement
benefits earned after her marriage to Glendon, she is not legally or
morally entitled to that portion of Glendon's retirement and pension
benefits earned prior to the time she married him.

Unless Spivey is

willing to admit that she only married Glendon for his money and
benefits, she cannot even assert that she is or will be prejudiced by
Mr. Harris receiving her lawful share of Glendon's benefits that she
should have been awarded in her divorce settlement with Glendon.

The

spouse of a person that is in possession of stolen or otherwise
misappropriated property does not acquire any rights in that property
simply because the rightful owner of the property does not learn of
the property's whereabouts until after the party unlawfully in
possession of the property dies.
A basic and fundamental principal of law, as previously stated in
Mrs. Harris Appeal Brief, is that the mere passage of time does not
constitute laches.
492.

24 Am Jur 2d. Divorce and Separation, § 487 and §

The Utah Supreme Court has continually and repeatedly held that

the mere laps of time, where the parties remain in the same relative
position, the delay working no serious wrong to the adverse party and
justice being possible, will not operate as laches.
Braffett,

Roberts v.

92 P 789 (1907), citing Hamilton v. Doolev, 15 Utah 280, 29

P 769 (1897).
Because Spivey has not and cannot demonstrate to this Court that
she has been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever by a delay on the
part of Mrs. Harris in asserting her lawful right to a share of
Glendon's pension and retirement benefits, the doctrine of laches does
not apply in this case.

Likewise, because Spivey cannot demonstrate

that she changed her position because of Mrs. Harris1 delay in

asserting her lawful right to a share of Glendon's pension and
retirement benefits, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable to this
case.
Because the doctrine of laches is inapplicable to the facts of
this case, the trial court erred both as a matter of fact and as a
matter of law in concluding that Mrs. Harris1 Petition was barred by
the doctrine of laches.

Therefore, the trial court's order dismissing

Mrs. Harris' Petition was improper and must be reversed by this Court.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN RULING THAT MRS.
HARRIS' PETITION WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Mrs.
Harris Petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

As

previously set forth in Mrs. Harrisfs Appeal Brief, Utah courts have
consistently and repeatedly declared that in order for the doctrine of
res judicata to apply the person asserting the doctrine must establish
three elements.
their privies.

First, both actions must involve the same parties or
Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must

have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and
should have been raised in the first action.

Third, the first suit

must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.

State in

Interest of J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161 (Utah App. 1994); Jacobsen v.
Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985).

Because Spivey was not a

party to the divorce proceeding between Mrs. Harris and Glendon, the
trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that Mrs. Harris1
Petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
It is an undisputed fact that the divorce proceeding between Mrs.
Harris and Glendon only involved Mrs. Harris and her former husband

Glendon.

Spivey was not a party to the divorce proceeding, and she

was not in privity with Glendon in the divorce proceeding.

As

previously set forth in Mrs. Harris1 Appeal Brief, a privy is defined
in Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978), as follows:
The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a person so identified in interest
with another that he represents the same legalright,this includes a mutual or successive
relationship torightsin property. Our Court has said that as applied to judgments or decrees
of court, privity means "one whose interest has been legally represented at the time."
citing Tanner v. Bacon. 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957, 960 (1943).
Spivey asserts that she was in privity with Glendon because he
assigned his rights to the retirement and 4OIK plans to her when he
made her his beneficiary in 1990.

(Spivey's Brief, page 18). As

support for this ludicrous assertion, Spivey cites to Black1s Law
Dictionary.

While Black's Law Dictionary is a well-respected

publication, it is hardly an authority to be cited in contravention of
a published definition of privity by the Utah Supreme Court.

Spivey's

cite to Black's Law Dictionary is, however, another indication of the
weakness of Spivey's argument and an indication of her desperation to
find anything to attempt to dispute the clear and controlling law that
supports Mrs. Harris' lawful right to a share of Glendon's retirement
and pension benefits.
Contrary to Spivey's assertion she was not in privity with
Glendon with respect to his marriage with Mrs. Harris.

Spivey

stretches the boundaries of reason and logic in asserting to this
Court that she was in privity with Glendon with respect to his divorce
proceeding with Mrs. Harris.

Spivey may have been in privity with

Glendon with respect to some things subsequent to their marriage, but
as a matter of law she was not in privity with him at the time of his
marriage to Mrs. Harris.

Spivey was also not in privity with Glendon

with respect to his marriage to Mrs. Harris, she was not in privity
with Glendon in his marriage to Mrs. Harris at the time of his divorce
from Mrs. Harris, unless Spivey married Glendon prior to the time he
was divorced from Mrs. Harris.

Does Spivey now want to claim she was

also married to Mrs. Harris and that she was also divorced from Mrs.
Harris in the divorce proceeding between Mrs. Harris and Glendon?
Because Spivey was not a party to the divorce action between Mrs.
Harris and Glendon, and because she was not in privity with Glendon
with respect to the marriage or the divorce proceeding between Mrs.
Harris and Glendon, she is not legally entitled to assert the doctrine
of res judicata as a defense to Mrs. Harris1 Petition.

Because Spivey

is not legally entitled to assert the doctrine of res judicata as a
defense to Mrs. Harris1 Petition, the trial court erred as a matter of
law in dismissing Mrs. Harris1 Petition.
Spivey's assertion that Mrs. Harris' Petition is barred by
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988) and Ostler
v. Ostler, 789 p.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990) is simply not true.

The

factual situation of both Throckmorton. and Ostler, are
distinguishable from this case.

In neither Throckmorton nor Ostler

did the parties seeking to modify the divorce decrees present
uncontrovertible evidence that the other parties to the divorce
proceedings had fraudulently misrepresented the nonexistence of
martial property.

Both of the parties seeking to modify the divorce

decrees in Throckmorton and Ostler knew of the existence of their
spouses' retirement and/or pension benefits.

Mrs. Harris did not

learn of Glendon's retirement and pension benefits until 1995 when her
attorney discovered the existence of those benefits while conducting
discovery in the probate case of Glendon's estate.

Because of Glendon's fraudulent representations to the court
during his divorce proceeding with Mrs. Harris, the doctrine of res
judicata as applied in Throckmorton and Ostler does not apply in this
case.

Res judicata does not apply if one of the parties to the

previous proceeding committed fraud.

See 46 Am Jur 2d Judgments,

§ 601 declaring:
[T]he principles of res judicata may not be invoked to sustain fraud, and a judgment
obtained by fraud or collusion may not be used as a basis of the application of the doctrine
of res judicata.
Because the doctrine of res judicata, as announced in
Throckmorton, does not apply to Mrs. Harris' Petition, the trial court
erred as a matter of law in granting Spivey's Motion to Dismiss.
error was prejudicial and reversible.

That

Therefore, this Court must

reverse the trial court's order dismissing Mrs. Harris' Petition and
enter instructions to the trial court to modify the Divorce Decree
between Mrs. Harris and Glendon and instruct the trial court to award
Mrs. Harris her rightful and lawful share of all of Glendon's
retirement benefits, including his pension benefits, 4OIK Plans and
457 benefits.
Spivey asserts that Carpenter v. Carpenter, 722 P.2d 230, 150
Ariz. 52 (Ariz. 1986) as cited in Mrs. Harris' Appeal Brief does not
support Mrs. Harris' assertion that this Court should adopt the better
reasoned position that a divorce decree should be modifiable after the
death of one of the parties to the divorce.

Spivey claims that

Carpenter only allowed modification of the divorce decree because
Arizona is a community property state.

While there is nothing in

Carpenter to support that assertion, even if true, Carpenter still
stands for the proposition that Mrs. Harris' divorce decree with
Glendon should be modified.

What Arizona calls community property, Utah simply calls marital
property.

If Arizona permits modification of a divorce decree after

the death of one of the parties to properly distribute "community
property11, then Utah should permit a divorce decree to be modified
after the death of one of the parties to the action in order to
properly distribute marital property.
What Carpenter really stands for is the clear trend of the
majority of courts throughout this country to recognize that divorce
decrees should be permitted to be modified after the death of one of
the parties to the divorce action.

Carpenter stands for fundamental

principals of fairness, equity and justice by permitting a court to
modify a divorce decree, after the death of one of the parties to the
divorce, in order to distribute marital property, avoid fraud and
further the interests of justice.

Carpenter clearly supports Mrs.

Harris1 assertion that her divorce decree with Glendon should be
modified and that she should receive her rightful share of Glendon's
retirement and pension benefits, benefits of which she was wrongfully
and fraudulently denied.
Fraud upon the court justifies a court modifying a divorce so
obtained.

See St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615, 619 (Utah 1982).

Because Glendon's sworn statement, made in the divorce proceeding in
the with Mrs. Harris, indicating that he had no pension or retirement
benefits was fraudulent, Mrs. Harris is legally entitled to have the
divorce with Glendon modified.

POINT III
WHETHER A DIVORCE DECREE CAN BE MODIFIED AFTER THE DEATH OF ONE
OF THE PARTIES TO THE DECREE IS A QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION THAT
THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE.
As previously stated in Mrs. Harris1 Appeal Brief, Mrs. Harris1

counsel has not found any Utah case that addresses the issue of
modification of a divorce decree after the death of one of the parties
to the decree.

And, as previously stated, the only real issue in this

appeal is whether this Court will take the position that a divorce
decree may be modified after the death of one of the parties to the
decree.
In her argument against Mrs. Harris1 assertion that this Court
should adopt the majority, and better-reasoned position that a divorce
decree may be modified after the death of one of the parties, Spivey,
again, in direct contravention of Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration, cites to Judge Schofield Memorandum Decision
in this case as authority in her Brief.
21).

(Spivey1s Brief at pages 20-

Again, Spivey's citation to Judge Schofield's Memorandum

Decision as authority for this appeal is not only totally devoid of
any precedential value; it is a direct violation of Utah law and
should be stricken.

However, the portions of Judge Schofield's

decision cited by Spivey are particularly enlightening, though not
correct or controlling.
Judge Schofield states in his Memorandum Decision that:
A divorce decree settles the rights of the two divorcing parties. In this case Bonnie and
Glendon were divorced in May 1980, some fifteen years before this modification proceeding
was brought At that time their respective interests in marital assets were determined. Now
Bonnie asks that this Court modify that aged divorce decree. Yet, one of the parties is not
present, nor can he be present as he died three months before the filing of this action. His
property rights were fixed when he died. If Bonnie had any claim against him, it would be a
claim against his estate, not a claim to modify the divorce decree. Yet she is asking this
Court to ignore the fact of his death and determine the rights which she and Glendon have
concerning a retirement benefit which, accrued, if at all during a marriage which terminated
fifteen years ago. (Emphasis a d d e d ) .
Judge Schofield citing Farrell v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299, 301 (Utah App.
1992), which in turn cited to Nelson v. Davis, 592 P.2d 594, 597 (Utah
1979), then goes on to declare:

IfFarrell and Nelson have meaning, it is that as between divorcing parties, property rights
are fixed and at the time of death and divorce cannot change or modify the effect of death
infixingproperty rights. If that is so in Farrell it is more so in this case as Bonnie brought
this action well after Glendon9s death. Any property rights which she may have had in
common with Glendon were fixed and would have need to be decided in the context of a
probate of his estate, not by resort to a modification of the old divorce decree.
(Emphasis a d d e d ) .
Judge Schofield's decision, while incorrect, is particularly
interesting because Judge Boyd K. Park of the Fourth District Court,
when asked by Spivey to in the probate proceeding to decide whether or
not Glendon's retirement and pension benefits were part of Glendon's
estate and whether or not division and distribution of Glendon1s
pension and retirement could be made in the probate proceeding, ruled
that Glendonfs pension and retirement benefits were not part of
Glendonfs estate and that a determination and distribution of
Glendon's retirement and pension benefits could not be made in the
probate proceeding.

A copy of Judge Park's Memorandum Decision is

included in the Addendum to this Reply Brief.
If Judge Schofield is right then Mrs. Harris is required to
litigate her claims to her share of Glendon1s retirement and pension
benefits in the probate case.

However, if Judge Park is right Mrs.

Harris cannot litigate her claims in the probate case because
Glendon's retirement and pension benefits are not part of his estate.
Therefore, Mrs. Harris must litigate her claims in another proceeding.
Mrs. Harris cannot litigate her claims in the original divorce
proceeding because the divorce court lost jurisdiction over the case
upon the death of Glendon.

Consequently, Mrs. Harris was required to

file a new case, i.e., this case in order to litigate her lawful claim
to a portion of Glendonfs retirement and pension benefits.

If Mrs.

Harris is not allowed to litigate her claim anywhere, then her due
process rights under both the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution

of Utah have been violated.

Mrs. Harris must be afforded a forum

where she is able to litigate her lawful claim to a portion of
Glendon's pension and retirement benefits.
Spivey admits under the prevailing authority, a divorce decree
may be modified after the death of one of the parties to the divorce
when the surviving spouse has been wrongfully deprived of their right
to a marital asset or marital property by the deceased spouse.
(Spivey's Brief, page 21). Spivey, however, then asserts that Mrs.
Harris is not entitled to modify her divorce decree with Glendon
because there was no fraud.

That assertion is a blatant lie.

It is

undisputable that during his divorce with Mrs. Harris, Glendon falsely
represented that he had no retirement benefits.
23 & 117-118).

(Record at pages 24-

That representation was fraudulent.

Spivey then asserts that because a "trial" was held that
Glendon's false representations are somehow sanitized.

Spivey

advances the novel idea that fraud and misrepresentation in the
context of a trial is acceptable, if the fraud and misrepresentation
is not discovered.

However, fraud and misrepresentation in a default

setting is bad, but fraud is not bad if the person being defrauded is
represented by counsel.

But for some reason, Spivey cites no

authority for that inane proposition.
Spivey next cites this Court to Karren v. Karren, 25 Utah 87, 60
P 465 (1902) as authority that a divorce decree cannot be modified
after the death of one of the parties to the divorce.

Karren is based

on a former statute, i.e., Utah Revised Statutes, § 1212.

Because

Karren is based on old law and a non existent statute, it is of no
precedential value in this case.
Spivey has not, and cannot, cite this Court to any Utah case

declaring that a petition to modify a divorce decree, in a case in
which one party has died, must be filed in the divorce proceeding.
There is no such case.

POINT IV
MRS. HARRIS PETITION TO MODIFY THE DIVORCE DECREE BETWEEN HER AND
GLENDON IS PROPER.
A petition to modify a divorce decree need only allege changed
circumstances if the party seeking the modification is seeking to
modify the decree with respect to some provision that was decided or
addressed in the original decree.

A divorce decree can be modified to

include items that were omitted, incorrectly included or to correct
mistakes in the decree.

In such cases, an allegation of change in

circumstances in not necessary.
Because Mrs. Harris is only seeking to modify her divorce decree
with Glendon with respect to the retirement and pension benefits of
Glendon that were acquired during their marriage and because the
distribution of those benefits was not addressed during the divorce
between Mrs. Harris and Glendon, there was no need for Mrs. Harris to
allege a change in circumstances in her Petition.

Nonetheless, Mrs.

Harris set forth facts in opposition to Spivey's Motion to Dismiss
which clearly establishes a change in Mrs. Harris1 circumstances since
her divorce from Glendon, facts which satisfy any requirements
justifying a modification of her divorce decree with Glendon.
Furthermore, Spivey never raised the issue of any defect in Mrs.
Harris1 Petition in the trial court.

Therefore, she is estopped to do

so on appeal.
Spivey's reference to state and federal rules and regulations
concerning distribution of retirement or pension benefits and the

designation of beneficiaries of retirement or pension benefits is
totally irrelevant to any issue in this proceeding.
Contrary to Spivey's assertion, Mrs. Harris is not seeking
alimony or support.

Mrs. Harris is not seeking to vacate the divorce

decree between her and Glendon.

Mrs. Harris is simply seeking to

modify the divorce decree between her and Glendon in order to receive
what rightfully and legally belongs to her, i.e., that portion of
Glendon's retirement and pension benefits that she helped earn during
her eighteen year marriage to Glendon.

Retirement and pension

benefits that under Utah law are marital property.

Property rights of

which she was unlawfully and improperly deprived because of Glendon's
fraudulent representations to the divorce court.
It is extremely hypocritical and disingenuous of Spivey to claim
out of one side of her mouth that Mrs. Harris1 Petition is improper
because Mrs. Harris did not specify the changes in her circumstances
since her divorce from Glendon in her Petition.

Yet, out of the other

side of her mouth, claim that Mrs. Harris1 undisputed changes in her
circumstances are irrelevant.

Spivey demands that Mrs. Harris specify

changes supporting her Petition, yet, asserts that any changes are
irrelevant.
Spivey's hypothetical examples do not give credence to her
position.

In both hypotheticals the spouse should and would be

permitted to modify the divorce decree to obtain their lawful share of
marital property which they failed to receive, and which the divorce
courts failed to distribute, due to the fraud of the other spouse.
Yes, Elizabeth Taylor would and should be permitted to modify a
divorce decree that is 40 years old if her husband fraudulently
represented the nonexistence of marital property, and Ms. Taylor was

denied her lawful share of that marital property by the fraudulent
representations of her spouse.
Judge Schofield simply erred in concluding that Mrs. Harris is
not entitled to modify the divorce decree between her and Glendon in
order to obtain her rightful and lawful share of Glendon's pension and
retirement benefits.

Benefits that are indisputably marital property,

benefits which Mrs. Harris was deprived of because of the fraudulent
representations made by Glendon in the divorce proceeding.
The Utah Supreme Court specifically held in St. Pierre v.
Edmonds, supra, that a divorce decree that is obtained through fraud
may be challenged in an independent action.

Id, at 619. Therefore,

Mrs. Harris' Petition to modify the divorce decree between her and
Glendon is proper, and contrary to Judge Schofield's decision, Mrs.
Harris did not need to seek a modification of the divorce decree in
the divorce case.
The trial court clearly committed reversible and prejudicial
error when it granted Spivey's Motion to Dismiss.

Therefore, the

trial court's order dismissing Mrs. Harris' Petition must be reversed
and the trial court directed to modify the Divorce Decree between Mrs.
Harris and Glendon, awarding Mrs. Harris her rightful and legal share
of all of Glendon's retirement benefits, including his pension
benefits, 401K Plans and 457 benefits.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT SPIVEY'S REQUEST
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
The trial court correctly ruled that Mrs. Harris' Petition was
not a violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

(hereinafter, "Rule 11").

Therefore, Spivey's Cross-Appeal requesting

attorney's fees must be denied.
In her attempt to convince this Court that there is a "vendetta"
against her, Spivey makes references to alleged actions that allegedly
transpired in the probate case of Glendon's estate.

Those alleged

facts, even if true, do not constitute a violation of Rule 11. The
mere fact that Charles Schultz represents Mrs. Harris and also
represents Don Spivey, Cynthia Sorensen and Lisa Spivey in the probate
proceeding regarding Glendon's estate does not mean that a vendetta is
taking place against Spivey.

Nor, does the fact that Charles Schultz

represents Don Spivey, Cynthia Sorensen and Lisa Spivey in the probate
proceeding regarding Glendon's estate constitute a violation of Rule
11 in this case.

The two cases have nothing in common other than the

fact that Mrs. Harris' counsel learned of Glendon's pension and
retirement benefits and learned that Mrs. Harris did not receive her
rightful and lawful share of those benefits in her divorce with
Glendon while conducting research in the probate case.
Mr. Schultz has also represented Mrs. Harris and Lisa Spivey in
actions with Salt Lake City Corporation.
against Salt Lake City Corporation?

Could there be a vendetta

Is Mr. Schultz's representation

of Mrs. Harris and Ms. Spivey in the cases with Salt Lake City
Corporation a violation of Rule 11?
In pertinent part, Rule 11 states as follows:
Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed
by at least one attorney of record in his individual name who is duly licensed to practice in
the state of Utah. . . . The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or

reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. . . .
Even if this Court chooses to affirm Judge Schofield's decision
and chooses to adopt the position that in Utah a divorce decree cannot
be modified after the death of one of the parties to the divorce, Mrs.
Harris1 Petition is not a violation of Rule 11. Mrs. Harris1 counsel
conducted extensive research in this case before filing Mrs. Harris1
Petition, more so than any other case he has ever filed.

There is an

overwhelming amount of authority supporting the validity and
appropriateness of Mrs. Harris1 Petition.

See e.g., 24 Am Jur 2d,

Divorce and Separation, § 487, 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, §
492, 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 601, and Carpenter v. Carpenter, supra.
There is clear and undisputable authority to justify Mrs. Harris1
argument for this Court adopting the position that a divorce decree
can be modified after the death of one of the parties to the divorce.
It is undisputed that there is no case law on this issue in Utah by a
Utah appellate court.

Therefore, Mrs. Harris' argument is, even under

worst case scenario, a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.

Mrs. Harris1 Petition was

not filed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Spivey flatters herself.

Spivey is just not important enough for Mrs.

Harris to waste her time and money on a "vendetta11 against Spivey.
The standard of review for an alleged Rule 11 violation is a
clearly erroneous standard.
1236 (Utah 1992).

See Barnard v. Sutliff, 946 P.2d 1229,

The Utah Supreme Court further declared in Barnard

v. Sutliff that an attorney need not reach the correct conclusion to
avoid Rule 11 Sanctions.

He only needs to make a reasonable inquiry.

Lie 11 does not require a perfect search, only a search that is
>jectively reasonable.

Therefore, even if this Court agrees with

idge Schofield's decision to dismiss Mrs. Harris's Petition, Mrs.
irris' argument in support of her Petition and the research conducted
rior to filing that Petition and the authorities cited by Mrs. Harris
1 support of her Petition clearly and unequivocally establish that
ider no set of circumstances was Mrs. Harris' Petition filed in
Lolation of Rule 11.
Though Judge Schofield erred in dismissing Mrs. Harris' Petition,
i correctly held that, even under the improper law he applied to this
ase, Mrs. Harris' Petition was not a violation of Rule 11. That
iling was correct.

Therefore, Spivey's appeal of Judge Schofield's

snial of Rule 11 sanctions must be denied and Judge Schofield's
anial of Spivey's request for attorney's fees affirmed, irrespective
f how this Court decides on the issue of modification of a divorce
ecree after the death on of the parties to the divorce.

X
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The trial court committed reversible and prejudicial error when
t granted Spivey's Motion to Dismiss.

Therefore, the trial court's

rder dismissing Mrs. Harris' Petition must be reversed and the trial
ourt directed to modify the Divorce Decree between Mrs. Harris and
lendon, awarding Mrs. Harris her rightful and lawful share of all of
lendon's retirement benefits, including his pension benefits, 401K
lans and 457 benefits.

WHEREFORE, Mrs. Harris respectfully request that this Court
reverse the order entered by the trial court dismissing her Petition
and enter instructions directing that she be awarded her rightful and
legal share of the pension and retirement benefits of her former
husband, Glendon G. Spivey, including his 4OIK plans and 457 plans.
Dated this

day of June 1996.

Chaflfe^fe Schultz
Attorney for Bonnie Kay Harris

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Z?

day of June 1996, I served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief to the persons at
the addresses listed below by depositing a copy in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid.
Sidney Gilbert
GILBERT & STEWART
190 West 800 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Vernon L. Snow
Dale Jeffs
128 East 100 North
Provo, Utah 84606

Schultz

ADDENDUM

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-508
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 487
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 492
46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 601
Memorandum of Judge Boyd K. Park in case No. 943400572 PB

ww

u i A i i iwu&a

ur

o i v i i - i rttU'^li.lJUftEi

KUie

11

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117.
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 5, 9, 63 to 98,
371 to 375, 418.
A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photographs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322.

Propriety and effect of use of fictitious name
of plaintiff in federal court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369.
Key Numbers. — Pleading ** 4, 13, 15,
38 V2 to 75, 307 to 312, 340.

Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers;
sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature
of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 11, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
sanctions under this rule did not legally prejudice plaintiffs and there was no final appealAmendment of complaint.
able order. Barton v. Utah Transit Auth., 872
Appeals.
P.2d
1036 (Utah 1994).
Nature of duty imposed.
Nature of duty imposed.
Reasonable inquiry.
Violation.
This rule emphasizes an attorney's public
—Question of law.
duty as an* officer of the court, as opposed to the
—Sanctions.
attorney's private duty to represent a client's
—Standard.
interest zealously. Clark v. Booth, 821 P.2d
Cited.
1146 (Utah 1991).
Amendment of complaint
Reasonable inquiry.
Amendment by an attorney of the facts
Certification by an attorney "that to the best
stated in a complaint was sufficient to estab- of his knowledge, information, and belief
lish those facts as they would have been by a formed after a reasonable inquiry the comverified complaint before the changes made by plaint is well grounded in fact and is warthis rule making verification unnecessary. ranted by existing law" does not require him to
Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt obtain a favorable expert medical opinion beLake County, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168 fore filing a medical malpractice action.
(1954).
Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 vUiah Ct
App. 1989).
Appeals*
Under this ruL- «i party need not have
After voluntary dismissal by plaintiffs, the
trial court's retention of jurisdiction to enforce reached the correct conciu^ n he need only
ANALY8IS

973

OPERATION OF THE COURTS

Rule 4-510

Statement of the Rule:
(1) At the time of depositing with the Clerk of the Court any proceeds from
a trustee's sale in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-29, the
trustee shall file an affidavit with the clerk setting forth the facts of the
deposit and a list of all known claimants, including known addresses. The
clerk shall notify the listed claimants within 10 days of receiving the affidavit
of deposit.
(2) Any claimant may then file a petition for adjudication of priority to
these funds and request a hearing before the court. The petitioner requesting
the hearing shall give notice of the hearing to all claimants listed in the
trustee's affidavit of deposit and any others known to the petitioner. All persons having or claiming an interest must appear and assert their claim or be
barred thereafter.
(3) Pursuant to the determination hearing, the court will establish the
priorities of the parties to the trustee's sale proceeds and enter an order with
the clerk of the court or county treasurer directing the disbursement of funds
as determined.

Rule 4-508. Unpublished opinions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform standard for the use of unpublished opinions.
Applicability:
This rule Bhall apply to all courts of record and not of record.
Statement of the Rule:
Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value
and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for purposes of
applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
[Added effective January 15, 1990.)

Rule 4-509. [Reserved.]
Rule 4-510. Alternative dispute resolution.
Intent:
To establish a program of court-annexed alternative dispute resolution for
ivil cases in the District Courts.
Applicability:
These rules shall apply to cases filed in the District Court in the Third and
?ifth Judicial Districts. The rules do not apply to actions brought under Chapters 3a and 6 of Title 78, Chapter 6 of Title 30, Chapter 12 of Title 62A,
Chapter 20a of Title 77, Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or to
incontested matters brought under Chapter 1 of Title 42, Title 75, and Chapers 22a, 30 and 41 of Title 78.
statement of the Rule:
(1) Definitions.
(A) "ADR" means alternative dispute resolution and includes arbitration, mediation, and other means of dispute resolution, other than court
trial, authorized by this rule and URCADR;
(B) "ADR program" means the alternative dispute resolution program
described in by Chapter 31b, Title 7g;
(C) "Binding arbitration" means an ADR proceeding in which the
award is final and enforceable as any other judgment in a civil action

21 \ m j u r 2d

DIVORCE AND SEPARATION

§487

jurisdiction, 37 or which «*» void on its face,38 may be vacated at am tim<\ \n the
absence of laches or estoppel.3* A statute which prescribes a time vvithin which
one must file a petition to vacate on the ground of mistake, in.id\enence,
surprise, or excusable neglect, does not affec the time wirhm which the court
may exercise its inherent power to vacate on the ground ol fraud40 or !.ick of
jurisdiction. 41
The power of a court of equity to set aside a judgment of divorce procured
by fraud is not restricted by a statute allowing a new trial to be granted w..hin
one year after entry of a fraudulent judgment, where the fraud remained
undiscovered for that time and could not have been discovered within it by
any reasonable diligence.4*
§487. Laches.
Generally, in divorce case^, whoever wishes to have a judgment set aside on
the ground that it was obtained by fraud, duress, accident, mistake, or surprise
must act diligently in seeking relief.43 Independent of statute, delay in instituting the proceeding may constitute such laches as will deprive the applicant of
the rigjit to have the judgment or decree in a divorce case vacated,44 In a
proper case laches is a defense even if the complainant asserted his grounds
for vacating the judgment within the statutory time.4* Even though the decree
is void for want o£ good service of process, laclies may prevent the vacation of
the decree. 46
The mere lapse of time doc* not constitute laches within the foregoing
rules; it must appear that the delay has caused injury.47 Instances of prejudice
ability of insanity, drain removes the disability,
and thereupon the time for instituting the
proceedings begins to run. Wood v Wood, 130
Iowa 128, 113 NW 492.
37. Chisholm v Chisholm, 98 Fla 1196, 125
So 694; Baker v Baker, 221 Ga 332, 144 S t 2d
*29; Williamson v Williamson. (Iowa) U>\ NW
482; Huffman v Huffman. 47 Or 610, 86 P 593.
Annotation:

6 ALR2d 638, § 11; 22 ALK2d

1325. § 10.

38. Fraunhofer v Price. 182 Mont 7, 594 P2d
324; Shaver v Shaver, 248 NC 113. 103 St2d
791.
In Alabama the view has been taken that a
divorce decree which is void on the face of rhe
record for want of jurisdiction may be vacated
at anv ^me, but thai "if the decree is not void
or* ••><? face of the record it cannot be vacated
on a motion made more than 30 days after ic
was rendered. Aiello v Aietlo, 272 Ala 505, 133
So 2d 18.
*9. As to laches and estoppel, sec §§487,
4«'Sfc, infra.
40. McGuinness v Superior Court of San
Francisco. 196 Cal 222, 237 P 42, 40 ALR
11!0.

Annotation:

12 ALR 2d 163. f 5.

44. Horton v Stegnuer (CA8 Colo) 175 F
756; Multer v Mulier, 280 Ala 458, 195 So 2d
105; Re Marriage of Wipson (2d Dist) 113 Cai
App 3d 136, 169 Cal Rptr 664 (delav of more
than three vears in seeking relief from dissolution of marriage judgment); McElrath v McKl»ath, 120 Minn 380. 139 NW 708; Crann v
Cratin. 178 Miss 896. 174 So 255. Watkinson v
Watkinson, <<8 NJ Kq 632. 60 A 931. B.duell v
B.dwell. 139 NC 402, 52 S£ 55. Hantord v
Hartford. 53 Ohio App 2d 79, 7 Ohio Ops 3d
53. 371 NK2d 391; Grant \ Grant. 233 SC 433.
105 SF*2d 523; Karren v Karren. 25 Utah H7.
69 P 4 J O .

Annotation:
12 Al.R2d 163. §6.
As to the vfi-f of laches on the pan of the
petitioner after rcmauugo <>! the spouse obitaining the divorce, see § 492, inira.
Practice
Aids.—Answer
alleging laches bv
plaintiff in asserting grounds for vacating divorce decree. 8A AM JUR PL 1 PK FORMS (Rev),
DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, Form 789.

45. Van De Rvt v Van De Rvt. 6 Ohio St 2d
31. 35 Ohio Ops 2d 42, 215 Nfc.2d o98. 16
ALR3d 271.

41. Swift v Swift, 239 Iowa 62, 29 NW2d 535.

46. Swift v Swift. 239 Iowa 62, 29 NW2d 535.

42. Wood v Wood. 136 Iowa 128, 113 NW
492.
43. Pryor v Pryor, 240 Md 224, 213 A2d 545;
Cook v Cool. 167 Or 480, 118 Wd 1070;
Grant v Grant. 233 SC 433. 105 SE2d 523.

47. Leathers v Stewart, 108 Me 96, 79 A 16;
Meyer v Meyer, 326 Mast 491. 95 NE2d 645.

Annotation: 6 ALR2d 639. I 11; 12 ALR2d
163. §5.
£17
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resuming from delay are the cases in which the pre\aihng partv, after a
reasonable delav, married an innocent third pan\ ** Another instance of
prejudice is the case where the person who obtained the dixone died a few
vears after obtaining it, for then the question as to the right to the di\oue
cannot be tried again and the te^'imom of 'he plaintiff cannot be made
available.4*
The delay which is significant is that which has occurred with knowledge or
notice of the facts giving the right to relief If, theiefore, the defendant was
not given adequate notice of the pendencv of the action, and he sought relief
with reasonable promptness after discovering the facts, he is not guilt) of
laches.50
§488. Estoppel.
One seeking relief from a divorce decree may be estopped from attacking
it.51 The estoppel may arise from conduct after the entrv of the decree. Thus,
one cannot be relieved from a judgment of divorce after using the privileges
which it confers; in other words, one cannot accept benefits of a decree and
not be bound by its burdens." The wife's acceptance of alimony allowed in a
dworce decree granted tot the husband is an element which, in combination
with other elements, may estop the wife from having the decree set aside,
despite the existence of good grounds for annulling it w Likewise, the wife's
acceptance of money and property in lieu of ahmonv and as a propertv
settlement, and her use of the money a^d propertv for her own benefit for
several years, may estop her from having the u^ "ne set aside.54 If the wife,
after the husband obtains a decree of divorce, brings action against him as an
unmarried woman to recover certain persom! propertv in his possession
belonging to her, she is estopped from afterward questioning the validity of
the divorce.65
Generally, if one against whom a divorce decree has been granted remarries,
he or she is thereafter estopped to assail the validity of the divorce,* although
48. 4 492, infra
49. Horton v Stegmver (CA8 Colo) 175 F
756, C a m Admr
Car. 9? Ky 5V2, 18 SW
4 53, VfcElrath v \kEIraih, 120 Minn 380 M9
NW 708
50. Lindley v Lindlcv. 274 AU 570, 150 So 2d
746
Annotation;

12 ALR2d 166. § 7.

51. Reichcrt v Appel (Fla) 74 So 2d 674,
Weihenngton v Wethenngton, 216 Ga 325,
116\SE2d 234; Attebery v Atteben. 172 \ e b
671, 111 NW2d 553, Karren v Karrt* 25 Utah
87. 69 P 465
As to the necessity for pleading estoppel in a
proceeding to vacate a divorce decree, see
§ 496, infra
52. Tennessee v Barton, 210 Ark 816, 198
SV\2d 512, Cratin v Cratin, 178 Miss *Q6, '74
So 255, Attebery v Attebery, 172 Neb 671, 111
NW2d 553
A divorce judgment would not be set aside
by bill of review v%here the complainant, who
was under no financial compulsion to do so,
voluntarily accepted the benefits of the judgment and continued to accept those >enefus
alter hec former husband's alleged fraud was

518

discovered and after a bill of revieu Has hied,
and uhere the rights of ihe former husband
would be prejudiced if the judgment *as set
aside Biggs v Biggs (Tex Ci\ App Nth Dist)
553 SV\2d 207, wnt dism w o j .
53. Mohler v Shank's Estate 93 lowt 271. 61
NW 981 B.d»ell v Bid*eil. 139 NC 102. 52 SK
55
54. McDonald v \eale, 35 III App 2d 140 IS2
\ L 2 d 366. cert den 372 LS 911, 9 L rd 2d
719.83 SCt 725
55. BaiK v Bailv, 44 Fa 274
56. Arthur v Israel. 15 Colo 147, 25 P 81.
later app 18 Colo 158. 32 P 68, error dismd
\j> I S 355 38 L Ed 474, 14 S Ci 5*3
Reichert v Appel (Fla) 74 So 2d 674. Davis v
Daws. 191 Ga 333, 11 SE2d 884. Coombcs v
Coombes, 91 Idaho 729. 430 P2d 95, Re
Marriage of Gnka. 90 III App 3d 443 45 III
Dec 820, 413 \ E 2 d 153. Justus v Justus 208
Kan 879, 495 P2d 98. Rouse v Rouse. 219 La
1065 55 So 2d 246, Jo\ v Miles, 190 Misi 255
199 So 771, Atteberv \ Aucberv, 172 Neb 671
111 \VV2d 553, Hanks v Hanks (SD) 296
NW2d 523 later app (SD) 334 \W2d 856
Annotation:

12 ALR2d 169, f 8.
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vvi" take into consideration the public pohev to prevent the basiardi/mg of
children of the second marriage and also the resulting injury to the innocent
partv to the second mamage.* 2 Nevertheless, the mere lapse of tune does not
constitute laches; the delay must have caused injurv. and if the second
marriage occurred soon after the divorce and at a time when the other partv
to the decree could not have been expected to seek relief, as \*here the
divorce was procured bv fraud and the innocent partv could not reasonably
have learned of the fraud m time to prevent the second marriage bv bringing
a proceeding to set aside the decree, the delay does not cause sufficient injury
to warrant the application of the doctrine of laches. M A delay of several
months or vears after learning of the entrv of a divorce decree before seeking
to have it set aside has been held not to constitute laches as a matter of law,
where the remarriage occurred before the first wife learned of the decree, so
that the delav in seeking relief after discovering the facts was not the cause of
the second wife's unfortunate situation.*4 Clearly, where a proceeding to vacate
a decree has been instituted belore the second marriage occurs, the second
marriage is not entitled to consideration when determining whether to grant
the motion or petition to vacate.9*
§ 493. Death of party.
The general nile is that an application to vacate a decree of divorce does
not lie after the death of a party, where property rights arc not involved, since
death itself severs a marital relation and the onlv object to be accomplished by
the vacation of the decree would be sentimental >r illusory.* Some courts
have recognized an exception to this rule where the decree v>ds obtained bv
fraud, the theory being that in such a case the court must be resolute to
preserve its integrity against imposition and that the party against v>hom the
divorce 'vas rendered should have opportunity to disprove his guilt of the
82. Bussey v Bussev, 95 NH 349, 64 A2d 4,
12 ALR2d 151. Hvatt v Hvati (1st Dept) 57
A D Div 2d 809, 395 NYS2d 2, Grant v GraYit,
2J3 SC 433, 105 SK2d 523. Karren v Karren,
. 5 Utah 87, 69 P 465
Annotation:

!7ALR4th 1153

83. Leathers v Stewart, 108 Me 96. 79 A 16.
Connelly v Connellv. 190 Md 79. 57 A2d 276.
Hd>! v Hall, 70 Mont 460, 22b P 469
Annotation:
12 ALR2d 163, § 5
The remarriage and subsequent death of the
plaintiff husband in a divorce suit, prior to the
nlmg by the divorced wife of a petition to
strike out the divorce decree, do n< i preclude
the first wife from attacking the divorce decree
as a fraud upon the court but are factors m
considering the application of lathes and the
necessary prejudice - resulting from the first
wife's unwarranted dtlav1 of 13 years in filing
the petition Pnor v Prvor, 240 Md 224, 213
\2d ri45
1 he prevailing husband who remarried
within one week after entry ol the divorce
d t a e c was not prejudiced bv his former wife s
six months' dela\ in filing a motion to varue
'he decree Vin De Rvt v Van De Rvt 6 Ohio
M 2d 31, 35 Ohio Ops 2d 42, 215 \fc2d f><>8,
]•> \LR3d 271

522

84. Brandt v Brandt. 76 Aril 154. 261 P2d
978, Connellv v Connelly, 190 Md 79. 57 A2d
276, Hall v Hall, 70 Mont 460. 226 P 469.
In a divorced life's bill of review action to
set aside the divorce judgment and alternativelv the propertv division portion thereof, the
defendant s remarriage, creation of a new community estate, and disposal of some assets
received in the divorce judgment, did noi as a
mailer of 'aw entitle the defendant to a summars judgment, where there was no showmg
rhut whatever prejudice defendant might have
exuenenced could not be remedied on retnal
of the case DeCluitt v DeCIuitt 'Tex Civ \pp
10th Dist) 613 SV\2d 777. writ UIMH W o j
85. \\oma<k v Woman 7^ Ark 2S1 83 SV\
957 motion »«> modit« o r u t e ^n 73 Ark 2'K),
o. VW » 136
Annotation.

' » 4LR2d 162, J 4

86. Dawson v Mavs. 159 Ark 331. 252 SVV 33.
30 ALR 1403 Lawrence v Nelson 113 Iowa
277 85 \ W 84. Scheihine v Baltimore & O R
R , 180 Md 168, 23 A2d 381 Bussev
Bussev.
94 NH 328, 52 A2d 856. Towns v Towns (Tex
C iv \pp 7th Dist) 290 SW2d 292, writ d.sm
w oj
Annotation:
1323 $ 8

6 ALR2d 645. § 13, 22 ALR2d

§ 601
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the fraud was extrinsic, that is, \* deprived the opposing party of the opportunity
to appear and present his ca^e m
With respect to extrinsic f-aud, the doctrine of res judicata will not shield a
blameworthv defendant from the consequences of his own misconduct *
AccordingK the principles ol res judicata mav not be invoked to sustain fraud w
and a judgment obtained bv fraud or collusion mav not be used as a basis lor
the application of the doctrine of res judicata ** This is true also of the doctrine
investing a judgment with conclusiveness as against a third person who is liable
over to the judgment debtor with respect fo the cause of action adjudicated •
In accordance with the above principles, where the omission of an item from
a single cause of action is caused by the fraud or deception of the opposing
party, the judgment in the first action does not bar a subsequent action for the
omitted item ' There are some cases, however, in which the second action is
95. Eichman v Fotomat Corp (4th Dist) 147
Cal App 3d 1170. 197 Cal Rptr 612 later
proceeding (CA9 Cal) 759 F2d 1434, 1985-1
CCH Trade Cases 1 66606, later proceeding
(CA9 Cal) 871 R d 784, 1989-1 CCH Trade
Cases 1 68485 reported at (CA9 Cal) 880 F2d
149 Cramer v Metropolitan Sav Asso , 136
Mich App 387 357 NW2d 51
A former wife s suit on a promissory note
was barred by m judicata where the wife had,
in the prior divorce proceeding, dismissed with
prejudice her counterclaim based on the note,
where the wife s claim that fraud had been
perpetrated on the dissolution court by the
husband by reason of his perjured testimony
wherein he denied execution of the note did
not qualify as fraud on the court, and where the
wife knew that her husband denied e\» < uuon of
the note in the dissolution action and could
h ive litigaied the genuineness of his signature
and the enforceability of the note in the prior
action Trout \ Truitt (Fla App D5) 383 So 2d
276 (criticized on oiher grounds as stated in
OeClaire v \ohanan (Fla) 453 So 2d 375)
96 Riehle v Manrolies 279 US 218 73 L Ed
b69 49 S Ct 310 In re Bloomer (BC WD Mich)
32 BR 2 J McCarn s F rst of Georgia Ins Co
(CA10 Okla) 713 F2d 609 Fleming v Cooper
225 Ark 634 284 *\\2d 857 58 Al R2d 694
Ldmonds v Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist 217
Cal 436, 19 P2d 502 Lpstein v Chatham Park
Inc (Super) 52 Del 5o 153 A2d 180 Kern v
Sutker (Fla) 40 So id 145 James W Glover
Lf « v rong 42 Hawaii 560 Butler v But'er
25J Iowa 1084 114 \ W 2 d 595 Carroll v
fullenon 215 Kv - ^ 286 SW 847 (ovrld on
other grounds in p*rt bv Ward v Southern Bell
Tel 8c Tel Co k% 43b SW2d 794) Oanchette
vVerner 155 Me "4 151 \2d 502 Chnstopher
v Sisk 133 Md 4* M \ 355 Skinner % I own
ship Board for \rfcentine Tp 238 Mich ^ 3
2 1 3 \W 680 In re Shea s ,V\ ill 509 NY 605
1 \ * 2 d 864 Sha- * Eaves 262 NC 656 I 58
SL2d 520 Heaslev c nnz (ND) 142 \V\ 2d 60b
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Norwood v McDonald, 142 Ohio St 299, 27
Ohio Ops 240, 52 NE2d 67, Howard v Huron,
5 SD 539, 59 NW 833, reh den 6 SD 180. 60
NW 803, Haudenschilt v Haudenschdt, 129 W
Va 92, 39 SE2d 328
97. Halloran v Blue & White Liberty Cab Co ,
253 Minn 436, 92 NW2d 794, New York Life
Ins Co v Nashville Trust Co 200 Tenn 513,
292 SW2d 749, 59 ALR2d 1086 Haudenschdi
v Haudenschilt. 129 W Va 92, 39 S£2d 328
98. New Orleans v Gaines s Adm r. 138 US
595 34 L Ld 1102, 11 S Ct 428 Weil v Defenbach, 3b Idaho 37 208 P 1025 Ball v Reese. 58
Kan o M 50 P 875, King v Emmons. 283 Mich
116, 277 NW cT ' 115 ALR 564 Halloran v
Blue & White Liberty Cab Co . 253 Minn 436,
<>2 NW2d 794, Nichols v Stevens, 123 Mo 96,
25 SW 578 27 SW 613, affd 157 US 370. 39 L
Ed 736, 15 S Ct 640, Robertson Lumber Co v
Progressive Contractors (ND) 160 NW2d 61
cert den and app dismd 394 US 714 J L cd
2d 671 89 S Ct 1451 Robinson v Phegiev S4
Or 124 163 P 1166 Seubert v Scubert 68 SD
195 299 NW 873 ater proceeding 69 SD 143
7 NW2d 301 Ne* Nork Life Ins Co v Nashvii'e
Trust Co 200 Tenn 513, 292 SW2d 749 59
\LR2d 1086 Butcherv J I Case Ihreshing
Mach Co (Tex Civ App> 207 SW 980 Hau
denschilt v Haudenschilt 129 W Va 92 39 SL2d
32S
99 Pezel v Yerex 56 Cal \ p p 304 205 » 475
Kim Poo Kum v Sugivama 33 Hawaii J 4 5 (#er
ber v Kansas Citv 311 Mo 49 277 SW 562
Hartford Acci 8c Indem Co v hirst \\i 1 II ink
3c Trust Co 281 NY 162 22 NFJd *2l 12J
\LR 1149
1 United States Rubber Co v Lucks \ i n t
Inc (Ma App D3) 159 So 2d 874 Johnson v
Provincial In* Co 12 Mich 216 Cauher Corp
v Skinner 241 NC 532 85 SL2d 909 Hvvti v
Smith 67 ND 425 272 NW 747 (ovrld on other
grounds in pan by Hopkins v McBant (ND) 427
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DATE: January 24, 1996
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

This matter came before the Coun on Petitioner Theresa G. Spivey's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike, which were submitted for decision on
December 5, 1995.
Counsel for Theresa Spivey filed a request for oral arguments on November 8, 1995.
Opposing counsel did not file a request. Because counsel could add nothing which would
affect the Court's decision on this matter, the request for oral arguments is denied.
The Court, having read the motions, accompanying memorandum in support and in
opposition, affidavits, and having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises
now makes the following:
RULING
1.

On September 18, 1995, Theresa Spivey filed her "Verified Petition for Exempt

Property, and Omitted Spouse's Share of Decedent's Property." In this petition, Theresa
Spivey prays for the payment of a 55,000 exempt property as surviving wife and for a coun
order granting her an omitted spouse's share under §75-2-301.
2.

Theresa Spivey filed her "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" on November 1,

1995. In her motion, she asks die Court to rule that the retirement interests and 401K plan

proceeds and the family home are not assets of the estate. Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 1-2.
3.

Along with the memorandum in support of the motion, she filed the affidavit of Dr.

Brian P. Tudor, who treated decedent for his brain tumor. Dr. Tudor recites a brief medical
history of the decedent and states his opinion that the decedent was "totally competent" from
1990 through 1992. Affidavit of Brian P. Tudor 16.
4.

Lisa Spivey, Don Spivey, Cynthia K. Sorensen, and Bonnie K. Harris (hereinafter

Lisa Spivey) filed a memorandum in opposition on November 13, 1995. In this
memorandum, they argue that the decedent was incompetent when he executed the deed and
retirement documents upon which Theresa Spivey relies. Attached to this memorandum were
the affidavits of George Morse, John Wilkinson, Dale Childs, Stephen Hedger, Maggie
Hedger, Carolyn McDougail, Gary Thomas Spivey, Cynthia K. Sorensen, and Bonnie
Harris. The affiants were co-workers or otherwise acquaintances of the decedent and offer
various opinions as to his competence and some specific instances to demonstrate
incompetence, such as an inability to read and comprehend after he suffered his first seizure.
5.

On November 21, 1995, Theresa Spivey filed a motion to strike the affidavits of the

above persons. In arguing her motion to strike, Mrs. Spivey argues that the affidavits are
merely conclusory in form, based on information and belief and so must be rejected under
Rule 56(e), that the affidavits contain hearsay, and that the affiants a$e incompetent to testify
since none of them indicate they had any knowledge of the decedent executing deed or
retirement documents. See Theresa Spivey's Memorandum in Support of Her Motion to
Strike Affidavits of: George Morse, John Wilkinson, Dale Childs, Stephen Hedger, Maggie
Hedger, Carolyn McDougail, Gary Thomas Spivey, Cynthia K. Sorensen, Bonnie Harris.
6.

The Court will first address the motion to strike and then move on to the motion for

partial summary judgment.
MOTION TO STRIKE

7.

One of the reasons that Theresa Spivey gives to strike the affidavits is that the affiants

do not have any knowledge of the decedent executing the documents in question. However,
the affidavits were offered to show incompetence on the part of the decedent at the time he
executed the documents. An affiant does not need to know of a persons act in executing a
document in order to testify to the mental condition of the person during that time. Each of
the affiants were acquainted with decedent during or immediately prior to the time the
documents were executed. As such, they do have personal knowledge of his actions,
demeanor and nature and are able to testify as to their observations at the time-this goes to
the weight of the evidence rather than the admissibility.
8.

Theresa Spivey also argues that the affidavits merely contain conclusory statements

and hearsay and as they are based on information and belief, should be rejected under Rule
56(e). The Court notes that the affidavits do contain some specific instances and
observations of the affiants which could cause one to question the competence of the
decedent. However, they are primarily statements of the opinions of the affiants as to the
competence of the decedent. The question then is whether these lay opinions of mental
competence are proper evidence.
9.

The courts of Utah have allowed lay witness opinion testimony on competency and

mental condition. In First Interstate Bank, et. al. v. David O. Kesler, et. al., 702 P. 2d 86
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's admission UL by witness
opinion that the testator was incompetent even though they had little contact with her in the
last few years of her life and about one year prior to the execution of the will. It should also
be noted that the testimony in Kesler was admitted in opposition to the testimony of two
psychiatrists who interviewed the testator on the day she signed the will and pronounced her
competent. In a liable action, the Court of Appeals allowed lay witnesses to testify on the
mental condition of the plaintiff to show the truth of statements that he was "mentally
deranged" and a "paranoid schizophrenic." Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P.2d 1374 (Ut. Ct. App.
1994).
10.

So long as the lay opinions meet the requirements of Rule 701, they are proper both

at trial and in affidavits. That the witness may not be an expert or fault may be found with
their observations goes to the weight to be given the evidence by the fact finder, not its
admissibility.
11.

The Court finds that the affiant's testimony, subject to appropriate foundation, may be

competent as to the mental condition of the decedent during the time they were acquainted
with him.
12.

The Court denies Theresa Spivey's Motion to Strike.
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Family Home
13.

The first item upon which Theresa Spivey's asks for summary judgment is that the

family home is not a part of the estate of decedent. Lisa Spivey argue* :Nu at the time the
home was deeded by decedent to himself and Theresa Spivey in joint tenancy, he was
incompetent to deed the property, relying on the affidavits discussed above.
14.

The affidavits provided by Lisa Spivey show there are genuine issues of material fact

sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
15.

The Court denies Theresa Spivey's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the

family home. The Court will squire an evidentiary hearing to address the issue of the
decedent's competence at the time he executed the deed.
Decedent's Retirement Interests and 401K Plan Proceeds
16.

The second item which is the subject of Theresa Spivey's motion is the decedent's

retirement interests and 40IK plan proceeds (hereinafter benefits). She argues that if the
proceeds did not pass to her by the documents decedent signed prior to his death, they pass
to her by operation of law, citing Utah Code Annotated §49-1-606(1).
17.

Lisa Spivey offers three arguments why summary judgment should not be given on

the benefits. The first is that the decedent was incompetent to change his beneficiaries at the
time he executed the documents designating Theresa Spivey. Whether decedent was
competent or not does not affect whether the benefits passed to his spouse by operation of

law.
18.

She also argues that "the Deceased's 40IK plan and benefits are voluntary

participation plans that are only made available through the State Retirement System" and
therefore §49-1-606(1) does not apply. Memorandum in Opposition to Theresa Gutirrez [sic]
Spivey's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 8. However, she does not cite any
statutory authority or case law for this position, nor does she offer any evidence that they are
somehow different from other plans offered by the State Retirement System other than this
single assertion.
19.

The documents which the decedent used to designate Theresa Spivey as beneficiary

bear no indication that the plans were somehow different or separate from the Utah
Retirement System or that they were subject to rules other than those found in the Utah State
Retirement Act. Neither has the Court been able to find suppoit for different treatment in
the Act or other statutes.
20.

The final argument is that the benefits are the subject of an appeal in another case.

The other case deals with whether the decedent's former wife may claim some of the
benefits. Apart from the same benefits being the subject matter of the cases, the appeal and
this case do not share the same issues.

The Court's determination that the benefits are not a

part of the estate will not be affected should the appeal result in the former wife having an
interest in the benefits. Accordingly, the Court sees no impediment to a grant of summary
judgment that the benefits are not a part of decedent's estate.
21.

The Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact that preclude

judgment as a matter of law that the retirement interests and 40IK plan proceeds are not a
part of decedent's estate.
22.

Summary judgment is granted as to the retirement interests and 401K plan proceeds.

Dated at Provo, Utah this 24 day of January, 1996.

BY^ffiE COURT:

£
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE
cc:

Charls A. Schultz
Vemon L. Snow
M. Dayle Jeffs

